Malgorzata Koraszewska has translated this into Polish.
One of the great unsolved mysteries of the 21st century is why, given what a catastrophe it proved to be, anyone, much less a whole phalanx of politicians, diplomats and “peace-makers,” have tried repeatedly to negotiate a peace settlement between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Given that the initial plan (Oslo Peace Process) was predicated on Arafat and the Palestinians renouncing their drive to destroy Israel, thus permitting a positive-sum, win-win solution to the problem, and that the Palestinians have clearly not renounced that drive, either formally (unchanged PLO charter, no Arabic text recognizing Israel) or in practice (terror attacks, genocidal incitement from the pulpit), the positive-sum possibility is blocked: Palestinians won’t agree to the conditions Israel needs (flexibility on border settlements, renunciation of “right of return”); while Israelis will not make crucial concessions (uprooting all the settlements) in return for what seems like it will bring more war under worse conditions.
And yet, repeatedly since the Oslo Jihad in late 2000, efforts have been made over and over to reach a settlement. Partly this was because Western, positive-sum-minded negotiators, convinced of the superiority and reasonableness of their approach, could not believe that it would not work. “We were so close,” they told themselves, “if only we get Israel to give more, then the Palestinians will agree.” Hence Barak’s efforts to win a peace in the teeth of war at Taba in January 2001; and Olmert’s even greater concessions in 2008.
Obama was the last one to take this seriously and he and his Secretaries of State, after announcing imminent breakthroughs (one year, 9 months), crashed and burned. And everyone knew, but no one would say, that the Palestinians refused to make the concessions Israel needed to take the gamble. On the contrary, “the whole world” (in an act of global bad faith) knew it was Israel’s fault. In so doing, they complied fully with the Palestinian negotiating strategy of “land for war.”
The Palestinian game was simple: demand concessions that Israel could not meet (withdrawal to ’67 borders, uprooting all settlements), refuse concessions that Israel needed (renounce right of return, change the PLO charter, stop genocidal incitement), and blame Israel for the failures to reach agreement. The Foreign Language Palestinian position is:
we have made all the concessions necessary, we have accepted the state of Israel; we agree to a two-state solution; we are willing to settle for 22% of historic Palestine; we fight for freedom and dignity. It is Israel, with its settlements on and occupation of that 22%, that are the impediments to peace. When Israel meets those minimum demands, there can be peace. Therefore, in the name of peace, force Israel to concede what we rightfully demand.
Of course, there’s a rather different read of this discourse. First, it’s not matched by similar statements in Arabic. On the contrary, just like Arafat’s Hudaybiyya speech to South African Muslims promised “temporary truce while we are weak to be broken later,” contrasted with his Nobel Prize speech about the “peace of the brave,” so this English “narrative” (read: cogwar narrative for infidel consumption) has no presence in the Arab language public sphere. On the contrary, in Arabic, the cogwar narrative for the faithful makes it clear: Land for War.
Note the open admission of double-talk and a public secret: everyone knows what the inspiring idea and great goal are, but don’t say it to outsiders. Note also the calculus: the
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